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REGULATORY LEVERAGING: PROBLEM OR SOLUTION?
William E. Kovacic* and David A. Hyman**
“Nice merger you’ve got here.
It would be a shame if anything was to happen to it.”1
INTRODUCTION
Worldwide, there are approximately 130 jurisdictions with
competition laws.2 The governmental entities charged with enforcing these
laws are typically called “competition agencies,”3 but many of these entities
do things other than competition law. Of the thirty-six agencies listed in the
Global Competition Review’s 2015 annual review, half have
responsibilities beyond their competition portfolio.4 The particulars vary
from country to country, but a list of the usual suspects would include
consumer protection; public procurement; and public utility access, pricing,
*

Visiting Professor, King’s College London, Global Competition Professor of Law and
Policy, George Washington University Law School, and Non-Executive Director, United
Kingdom Competition and Markets Authority. From 2006 to 2011, he served as a member
of the Federal Trade Commission and chaired the agency from March 2008 to March 2009.
**
H. Ross and Helen Workman Chair in Law, University of Illinois Colleges of Law and
Medicine. From 2001-2004, he served as Special Counsel at the Federal Trade Commission.
The views expressed here are the authors’ alone. The authors are grateful to participants in
workshops at Heidelberg University, Pembroke College of Oxford University, Rutgers
University Graduate School of Management, the University of Amsterdam, and the
University of Mannheim for many helpful comments and suggestions.
1
See Barry Popik, “Nice Place You Got Here. Be a Shame if Anything Happened to It.”
(July 15, 2009),
http://www.barrypopik.com/index.php/new_york_city/entry/nice_place_you_got_here_be_a
_shame_if_anything_happened_to_it (tracing historical usage of the phrase). See also Monty
Python’s Flying Circus: Army Protection Racket, YOUTUBE, 1:41–1:49 (Nov. 13, 2015)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pm5mtpPtW1Q [hereinafter Monty Python].
“Dino: You’ve . . . you’ve got a nice army base here, Colonel.
Colonel: Yes.
Dino: We wouldn’t want anything to happen to it.”
2
See William E. Kovacic, The United States and Its Future Influence on Global
Competition Policy, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1157, 1158 n.7 (2015) (discussing global
expansion in the number of competition agencies).
3
For example, in a planning document issued in 2011, the International Competition
Network describes the creation of the network in 2001 “by 15 competition agencies” and
observes that its membership “has since grown to 117 competition agencies.”
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, THE ICN’S VISION FOR ITS SECOND DECADE 1
(May, 2011), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc755.pdf.
4
See generally Rating Enforcement: The Annual Ranking of the World’s Leading
Competition Authorities, 18 GLOB. COMPETITION REV. passim (2015).
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and regulation.5 Several competition agencies also have the power to apply
broad public interest standards,6 or must implement expansive scalable
commands, such as the Federal Trade Commission’s power to proscribe
“unfair methods of competition.”7
In previous work, we have examined how the assignment of
multiple functions/areas of regulatory responsibility affects governmental
agency performance.8 Among other issues, we have considered the impact
of the mix of assigned tasks (i.e., whether the tasks are substitutes or
complements, and whether they aim at consistent ends); the impact of the
number and scope of assigned regulatory tasks on the likelihood of capture;
and the implementation costs and reputational consequences of having
multifunction agencies.9
In this article, we extend our analysis to consider regulatory
leveraging. Assume a competition agency that has significant regulatory
power, such as the right to review certain mergers before they are
consummated. Pursuant to this authority, the agency determines how
quickly mergers are cleared, or whether they can proceed at all. This
regulatory power is the functional equivalent of the market power that some
private firms enjoy. Further assume that the agency has responsibilities
beyond its competition portfolio—say, with regard to privacy and data
security. A firm seeks the approval of the agency to merge with another
company. What should we think if the agency uses its regulatory power in
policy domain A (i.e., merger approval) to extract concessions with respect
to policy domain B (i.e., privacy and data security)? Is that a good idea or a
5

See David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Competition Agencies with Complex Policy
Portfolios: Divide or Conquer?, in COMPETITION LAW ON THE GLOBAL STAGE: DAVID
GERBER’S GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW IN PERSPECTIVE 33, 33–34 (Nicolas Charbit & Elisa
Ramundo eds., 2013).
6
For example, the merger control mechanism in South Africa’s competition law obliges the
competition authority to account for a variety of public interest considerations. See DAVID
LEWIS, ENFORCING COMPETITION RULES IN SOUTH AFRICA: THIEVES AT THE DINNER TABLE
111–12 (2012). See also id., at 117–28 (discussing the design and operation of South
Africa’s public interest test).
7
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012). The origins and aims of this provision are examined in
William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 929, 930–39 (2010).
8
See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 5, at 33, 42; William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman,
Consume or Invest: What Do/Should Agency Leaders Maximize?, 91 WASH. L. REV. 295
(2016) [hereinafter Kovacic & Hyman, Consume or Invest]; David A. Hyman & William E.
Kovacic, Can’t Anyone Here Play This Game? Judging the FTC’s Critics, 83 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1948, 1973–74, n.151 (2015); David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why Who
Does What Matters: Governmental Design and Agency Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1446 (2014) [hereinafter Hyman & Kovacic, Who Does What]; David A. Hyman &
William E. Kovacic, Institutional Design, Agency Life Cycle, and the Goals of Competition
Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2163 (2013); William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman,
Competition Agency Design: What’s on the Menu? 8 EUR. COMPETITION J. 527 (2012).
9
See, e.g., Hyman & Kovacic, Who Does What, supra note 8.
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bad idea? Does your response differ if the agency is using its regulatory
authority in policy domain A to obtain concessions that it could not obtain,
or could realize only with great difficulty, if it focused solely on the
behavior of the firm in policy domain B? What if the agency is using its
regulatory authority in policy domain A to obtain concessions in policy
domain B that would be unconstitutional if it sought to impose them
directly? Does it make a difference if the agency has no regulatory
authority over policy domain B? What if the agency does not have
regulatory authority over policy domain B, but a different agency, which
does have that authority, has asked the competition agency to seek the
concessions at issue? Stated bluntly, is regulatory leveraging a troublesome
problem—or a useful solution?
Part I describes leveraging in the private and public sectors. Part II
provides four case studies of public sector leveraging. Part III considers the
costs and benefits of regulatory leveraging. Part IV offers several
suggestions for increasing the likelihood that leveraging is used for prosocial ends. Part V flags the existence of the converse problem/issue – i.e.,
leveraging regulators.
I.

LEVERAGING 101

“Leveraging” refers to one party exploiting a position of power to
gain an advantage over a counterparty.10 We introduce the concept of
leveraging by describing its application in competition law, and then by
describing analogous forms of behavior undertaken by public regulatory
agencies.
A.

Private Sector Leveraging

Private sector leveraging occurs when a firm uses market power
over Product A to distort rivalry for sales of Product B.11 If a firm has
market power over Product A, it can harm competition over Product B by
“tying” the purchase of the two products together.12 Consumers who want
Product A can be forced to buy Product B, even if they would not do so
otherwise. Similarly, the firm with market power over Product A can
10

See Leverage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining leverage as
“[p]ositional advantage that may well help a person get what he or she wants from others. . .
.”).
11
See KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY & COMMON LAW EVOLUTION
202–12 (2003).
12
See David S. Evans et al., A Pragmatic Approach to Identifying and Analyzing Legitimate
Tying Cases, in GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY: ECONOMIC ISSUES & IMPACTS 297, 305–06
(David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla eds., 2004) (explaining how tying may assist firms in
leveraging market power from one product to another).
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protect its position against market entry by firms that make complements
that might become substitutes.13 Competition law addresses these risks by
selectively prohibiting some (but not all) forms of tying, bundling, and
loyalty discounts.14 More controversially, some competition agencies have
targeted the “portfolio effects” of proposed mergers.15 These examples
make it clear that some forms of private leveraging have anticompetitive
consequences, and raise concerns that competition law has addressed.
B.

Public Sector (Regulatory) Leveraging

The public sector analog of private leveraging occurs in several
ways. In the main case, an agency uses its gatekeeping power within one
policy domain to alter the behavior of firms in other policy domains.16
Regulatory leveraging also can take place within a single policy domain,
where an agency uses its gatekeeping power with respect to one component
of that domain to obtain concessions from firms concerning a separate
element of the policy domain.17
Regulatory leveraging allows the agency to exploit its gatekeeping
authority in several ways. In some instances, leveraging enables the agency
to secure results that it might not have been able to achieve otherwise. In
others, leveraging permits the agency to attain those results without
recourse to other policy tools that the agency regards as more costly or
risky to use.
What kind of gatekeeping power makes regulatory leveraging
13

This was essentially the Department of Justice’s theory in the Microsoft case, which inter
alia involved the claim that Microsoft’s bundling of Internet Explorer with Windows 95 and
Windows 98 violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. See United States. v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d. 34, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Justice
Department Files Antitrust Suit Against Microsoft for Unlawfully Monopolizing Computer
Software Markets (May 18, 1998) (“The complaint . . . charges that Microsoft recognized
that the success of Netscape’s internet browser threatened Microsoft’s Windows monopoly
on PC operating systems.”). On the role of the tying allegations in the Justice Department’s
suit against Microsoft, see ANDREW I. GAVIL & HARRY FIRST, THE MICROSOFT ANTITRUST
CASES 61–66 (2014).
14
See ROBERT O’DONOGHUE & A. JORGE PADILLA, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ARTICLE 82
EC 381–84, 491–511 (2006) (describing application of European Union competition law to
bundling, loyalty discounts, and tying). See also Evans, et al., supra note 12, at 299;
HYLTON, supra note 11, at 202–12.
15
See THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, POLICY
ROUNDTABLES: PORTFOLIO EFFECTS IN CONGLOMERATE MERGERS 19 (2001),
http://www.oecd.org/competition/mergers/1818237.pdf. See also Thomas L. Ruffner, Note,
The Failed GE/Honeywell Merger: The Return of Portfolio-Effects Theory? 52 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1285,1321 (2003) (describing application of portfolio effects theory in European
Commission’s challenge to General Electric’s effort to acquire Honeywell).
16
See infra Part II.A.
17
See infra Part II.B-C.
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possible? The most obvious form of gatekeeping takes place when the
agency has ex ante approval authority over something that the regulated
entity wants, such as a license to operate in a given market (e.g., the right to
operate a radio station, or the franchise to offer cable TV services) or to
introduce a product (e.g., to sell a pharmaceutical). Without the regulator’s
ex ante approval, the firm cannot offer its intended service or product. A
second form of gatekeeping power is created by laws that require firms to
notify the regulator in advance of a contemplated measure (e.g., a merger).
Such laws require the expiration of a waiting period before the proposed
action may be taken. These laws give the regulator an opportunity to study
the proposed course of action, subject to a deadline that forces action within
a specified time.
In competition law, the second scenario arises frequently in merger
control. In 1976, the United States established what has become the leading
model for modern merger control by enacting the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (“HSR”).18 As implemented by rules
promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission, HSR requires the merging
parties to provide notice of certain proposed transactions to the FTC, and
establishes a mandatory waiting period during which the FTC or the
Department of Justice can decide whether to compel the production of
additional information.19 When the parties have produced the required
information, the antitrust agencies have a fixed period of time in which to
decide whether to challenge the merger.20 The parties cannot proceed until
the waiting period expires, or until the antitrust agency indicates that it will
not oppose the deal.21 One recent survey of global merger practice
identifies roughly seventy jurisdictions that have variants of the HSR
premerger notification and mandatory waiting period system.22
HSR and similar regulatory regimes have transformed merger
review from an ex post assessment of completed transactions into ex ante
review of proposed deals.23 Most merger-related litigation has been
replaced by negotiated settlements, resulting in either outright approval,

18

Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383
(1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012)).
19
See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 394–401 (7th ed.
2012) (discussing the requirements of the HSR mechanism).
20
Id. at 397–98; DOUGLAS BRODER, U.S. ANTITRUST LAW AND ENFORCEMENT: A PRACTICE
INTRODUCTION 137 (2010).
21
BRODER, supra note 20, at 137.
22
GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2016, at 450–79 (John Davies, ed.,
2016).
23
For analysis of this transformation, see Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by
Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 ORE. L. REV. 1383 (1998);
E. Thomas Sullivan, The Antitrust Division as a Regulatory Agency: An Enforcement Policy
in Transition, 64 WASH. U. L. REV. 997 (1986).
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divestitures, or conduct remedies.24 The HSR merger approval process is
tailor-made for the exercise of regulatory leverage, since firms prefer an
expedited resolution, and are willing to make concessions to accomplish
that goal.25 Stated differently, when time is of the essence—as it is in many
mergers—the agency will have considerable regulatory leverage. Of course,
if the agency overreaches, the regulated entity may be willing to walk away
from the transaction, or force the agency to go to federal district court to
enjoin the merger. Thus, there are limits to the concessions an agency can
extract. Yet the basic point remains the same: when a regulatory agency
controls access to a valuable resource, it can use that power to extract a
variety of concessions from regulated entities that want access to that
resource.
Perhaps less obviously, agencies can also use “global settlements,”
which reach beyond the specific controversy they are handling, to obtain
leverage over ancillary domains.26 If a company wants to put a dispute in
policy domain A behind it, it may be open to concessions in policy domain
B—even though the agency would otherwise lack the regulatory authority
to impose that result on its own.
Is regulatory leveraging a normal, legitimate, and perhaps
inevitable feature of agency design? Or is it the equivalent of “hostage
taking,” with the regulated entity forced to pay Danegeld in order to be left
in peace?27 We focus our consideration of that issue with four case studies
of regulatory leveraging.
II.

FOUR CASE STUDIES OF REGULATORY LEVERAGING

As we suggested above, regulatory leveraging can take place in
several scenarios. First, a regulator can seek to leverage its power across
distinct areas within a single policy domain. Second, a multipurpose agency
can leverage power across distinct policy domains within its portfolio of
duties. Third, a regulator can use the gatekeeping power of another agency
to obtain concessions from a firm that is subject to oversight by both
agencies. Fourth, an agency can use a public interest mandate to achieve
commitments that are not authorized by more specific legal commands.
24

See Sullivan, supra note 23, at 1001 (“[T]he Antitrust Division has changed from a
traditional, litigation-oriented enforcement agency to a regulatory agency. The Antitrust
Division, as an economic regulator, has adopted a negotiational rather than adversarial
posture.”).
25
BRODER, supra note 20, at 189–90.
26
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, STATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT HANDBOOK 215 (2d
ed. 2008).
27
But see RUDYARD KIPLING, Dane-Geld (A.D. 980-1016), in A KIPLING ANTHOLOGY:
VERSE 184–85 (1922) (“if once you have paid him the Dane-geld. You never get rid of the
Dane.”)

PROBLEM OR SOLUTION?
Below we offer case studies of each scenario.
A.

Bosch-SPX: Leveraging Across Two Antitrust Domains

In 2012, the FTC resolved two matters involving Robert Bosch
GmbH.28 The first matter involved Bosch’s proposed acquisition of SPX
Service Solutions U.S. LLC (“SPX”).29 The transaction would have given
Bosch a “virtual monopoly in the market for air conditioning recycling,
recovery, and recharge (ACRRR) devices.”30 That issue was resolved with
an agreement by Bosch to divest its automotive air-conditioner repair
equipment business, and make some licensing commitments.31
The same FTC press release went on to announce that the
Commission and Bosch had resolved an entirely separate dispute over
whether SPX had harmed competition by reneging “on a commitment to
license key, standard-essential patents (SEPs) on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms. The FTC alleged that SPX reneged on its
obligation to license on FRAND terms by seeking injunctions against
willing licensees of those patents.”32
Bosch agreed to abandon SPX’s claims for injunctive
relief, resolving an ancillary matter that long preceded the proposed
merger.33 The FTC had authority to review Bosch’s proposed
merger under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, and to challenge SPX’s
conduct under Section 5 of the FTC Act.34
It is not clear from the FTC’s press release how these two entirely
distinct issues came to be settled simultaneously.35 But the fact that they
appear in the same press release certainly leads us to believe they were
resolved as a package deal. Would the SPX matter have been resolved on
the same terms and within the same time frame if the FTC had pursued that
matter independently, by pursuing a separate case premised on Section 5 of
the FTC Act? Would the SPX matter have been resolved on the same terms
and within the same time frame if Bosch did not have a merger pending
28

Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Order Restores Competition in U.S. Market for
Equipment Used to Recharge Vehicle Air Conditioning Systems (Nov. 26, 2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/11/ftc-order-restores-competition-usmarket-equipment-used-recharge [hereinafter FTC Vehicle Air Conditioning Systems Press
Release].
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Clayton Antitrust Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731–32 (1914) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012)); Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 5, 38 Stat.
717, 719–21 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012)).
35
See FTC Vehicle Air Conditioning Systems Press Release, supra note 28.
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before the FTC? Bosch certainly had a huge incentive to give in on the SPX
matter in order to obtain speedy approval of the proposed merger—and
FTC personnel knew that. No one at the FTC has to say “nice merger
you’ve got there; it would be a shame if anything was to happen to it,” for
those seeking agency approval to understand how the game will be
played.36
B.

Data Protection/Privacy and Merger Approval: Cross-Domain
Leveraging by a Multipurpose Regulator

Over the past few years, the way in which private firms use data—
how they collect it, how they use it, and how they distribute it to third
parties—has become a major policy concern in the United States and
abroad.37 Should regulatory policies in this space be developed on an
industry-wide basis, through notice-and-comment regulation? Or should
privacy policy result from enforcement actions against bad actors? Might
merger review provide an opportunity for regulatory leverage in this space?
The FTC, the principal U.S. data protection authority,38 confronted these
issues in two merger reviews involving Google—in 2007, when Google
sought regulatory approval for its acquisition of DoubleClick,39 and in
2010, when the FTC reviewed Google’s purchase of AdMob.40
In both transactions, agency personnel debated whether the merger
review process should include an evaluation of Google’s data protection
and privacy policies.41 The debate was complicated by the fact that
36

See Monty Python, supra note 1.
On the emergence of privacy as a central U.S. policy concern, see generally Maureen K.
Ohlhausen & Alexander P. Okuliar, Competition, Consumer Protection, and The Right
[Approach] to Privacy, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 121 (2015). On the global dimensions of data
collection and privacy, see VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA
150–84 (2014).
38
See generally CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND
POLICY 145–328 (2016) (discussing development of FTC as principal U.S. privacy
regulator). We are currently working on an article that explores how the FTC ended up,
partly by choice, but largely by accident, as the nation’s primary privacy agency. David A.
Hyman & William E. Kovacic, By Accident or Design? The Future Institutional Framework
for U.S. Data Protection and Privacy Regulation (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript on file
with authors).
39
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Closes Google/DoubleClick Investigation (Dec.
20, 2007), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2007/12/federal-tradecommission-closes-googledoubleclick-investigation [hereinafter FTC Google/DoubleClick
Press Release].
40
Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Closes its Investigation of Google
AdMob Deal (May 21, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2010/05/ftccloses-its-investigation-google-admob-deal [herinafter FTC Google AdMob Press Release].
41
See FTC Google/DoubleClick Press Release, supra, note 38; FTC Google AdMob Press
Release, supra note 40.
37
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different units within the FTC were responsible for merger review (i.e., the
Bureau of Competition)42 and data protection and privacy (i.e., the Bureau
of Consumer Protection).43 The FTC clearly had the legal authority to
review Google’s proposed acquisitions of DoubleClick and AdMob.44 It
also had the legal authority to investigate Google’s data protection and
privacy policies.45 But agency personnel disagreed on whether the merger
review should be used as an excuse/pretext/justification to delve into
Google’s data protection and privacy policies.46
Some agency personnel (most of whom were in the Bureau of
Consumer Protection) thought the issue was a no-brainer.47 Of course the
FTC should take advantage of the fact that Google was seeking to acquire
DoubleClick and AdMob to investigate these issues—and use the merger
approval process to extract appropriate concessions to ensure that
consumers’ interests were protected. Others (most of whom were in the
Bureau of Competition) were concerned that (i) merger review was
supposed to focus on antitrust and harms to competition, rather than serve
as a means to achieve the agency’s data protection and privacy aims; (ii)
opening this particular can of worms would mean that the outcome of a
merger review could turn on whether the FTC or DOJ was conducting the
evaluation (since the FTC was more concerned with data security and
privacy than DOJ); and (iii) by making clear that merger review outcomes
could vary significantly depending upon which agency got the file, the
FTC’s use of the HSR process to implement privacy and data protection
policy would lead Congress to reassess the wisdom of having two federal
antitrust agencies share merger enforcement authority—an assessment that
might lead to the consolidation of all merger-control duties in the DOJ.
Ultimately, the FTC did not use the Google-DoubleClick or the
Google-AdMob merger review process to extract concessions from Google
regarding its data protection and privacy policies. Indeed, the FTC’s closing
statement in DoubleClick explicitly disclaimed such strategies, noting that
“the sole purpose of federal antitrust review of mergers and acquisitions is
to identify and remedy transactions that harm competition.”48 The FTC
42

Bureau of Competition, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureausoffices/bureau-competition (last visited June 30, 2016).
43
Bureau of Consumer Protection, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/aboutftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection (last visited June 30, 2016).
44
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 45(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
45
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
46
See FTC Google/DoubleClick Press Release, supra note 39.
47
As noted previously, one of us (Kovacic) served in various positions at the FTC from
2006-2011 when Google sought regulatory approval to acquire Double Click and AdMob.
See supra note *.
48
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement Concerning Google/DoubleClick, FTC File No. 0710170, at 2 (Dec. 20, 2007), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/418081/071220googledc-
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accordingly concluded that it lacked the legal authority to block or
condition approval of the transaction on non-antitrust grounds—which
would include data protection and privacy grounds.49 The closing
statement, joined by Chairman Majoras, and Commissioners Kovacic,
Leibowitz, and Rosch, also noted that the data protection and privacy issues
were not specific to Google-DoubleClick but extended to the entire online
advertising marketplace.50 As such, using the merger review process to
implement data protection and privacy regulation created a significant risk
of disparate treatment, and non-uniform enforcement of the law.51
Interestingly, although Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbor dissented, she
agreed it would be inappropriate to use the merger review process to
implement data protection and privacy regulations.52
C.

Leveraging Across Policy Domains Occupied by Separate
Regulators

Although the FTC declined to engage in regulatory leveraging to
deal with data protection and privacy, other regulators do not share that
view. In March 2014, the European Data Protection Supervisor issued an
opinion suggesting that European competition authorities should take
account of data protection and privacy concerns when deciding whether to
approve a merger.53 In effect, this would mean that the merger review
process will be used as the occasion (and opportunity) to impose
substantive privacy regulations on the merging entity. An alternative
approach, embraced by the European Commission’s Directorate-General
for Competition (DG-Comp), is to reframe the competition analysis to take
account of data privacy concerns, and examine whether the merger has the
commstmt.pdf.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 1–2.
51
See id. at 2 (“Not only does the Commission lack legal authority to require conditions to
this merger that do not relate to antitrust, regulating the privacy requirements of just one
company could itself pose a serious detriment to competition in this vast and rapidly
evolving industry.”).
52
Pamela Jones Harbour, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Dissenting Statement Regarding In
re Google/DoubleClick, FTC File No. 071-0170 (Dec. 20, 2007), at 10, http://www
ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/statementmattergoogle/doubleclick/071220harbour_0.pdf. As elaborated in a later work,
Commissioner Harbour proposed that privacy should be considered a qualitative dimension
of competition. Pamela Jones Harbour & Tara Isa Koslov, Section 2 in a Web 2.0 World: An
Expanded Vision of Relevant Product Markets, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 769, 773–74 (2010).
53
See European Data Protection Supervisor, Privacy and Competitiveness in the Age of Big
Data: The Interplay Between Data Protection, Competition Law and Consumer Protection
in the Digital Economy 22–23, (March 2014),
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultati
on/Opinions/2014/14-03-26_competitition_law_big_data_EN.pdf.
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effect of reducing the ability and willingness of the parties to provide
adequate levels of data protection.54
The issue is not limited to merger control. In March 2016,
Germany’s competition agency, the Bundeskartellamt, announced that it
had begun an investigation of whether Facebook’s privacy practices
constitute an “abuse of [dominant] market power” that would violate
Germany’s antitrust laws.55 At an antitrust conference in Washington, D.C.,
the EC Commissioner for Competition, Margarethe Vestager, spoke
approvingly of the German initiative.56
The precise motivation for the Bundeskartellamt investigation of
Facebook is unclear. We can only speculate about what factors led agency
officials to commence the matter. The investigation may reflect a belief that
competition law is a suitable tool to force dominant firms to observe
privacy law mandates, or to set broader policy for the digital economy.
Alternatively, perhaps the Bundeskartellamt embraces the aims of
Germany’s data protection regime and views competition law as a more
effective tool to achieve these aims, compared to the direct application of

54

Eric Auchard, EU Competition Chief to Eye ‘Big Data’ Concerns in Merger Probes,
REUTERS (Jan. 17, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-data-competitionidUSKCN0UV0ZG. This approach would treat privacy protection as a qualitative dimension
of competition, as firms distinguish themselves by providing stronger, or weaker, assurances
about how they will handle information obtained about consumer preferences. See also
Harbour & Koslov, supra note 50, at 770–74 (suggesting how privacy issues can be
accounted for within an antitrust assessment of competitive effects).
55
Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Initiates Proceeding Against
Facebook on Suspicion of Having Abused Its Market Power by Infringing Data Protection
Rules (Mar. 2, 2016),
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2016/02_03_
2016_Facebook.html (“There is an initial suspicion that Facebook’s conditions of use are in
violation of data protection provisions. Not every law infringement on the part of a dominant
company is also relevant under competition law. However, in the case in question
Facebook’s use of unlawful terms and conditions could represent an abusive imposition of
unfair conditions on users. The Bundeskartellamt will examine, among other issues, to what
extent a connection exists between the possibly dominant position of the company and the
use of such clauses.”). Facebook has been the subject of close scrutiny by European privacy
regulators. See Sam Schechner & Natalia Drozdiak, Facebook Faces Privacy Suit in Europe
as Scrutiny Increases, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2015, at B5; see also Guy Chazan & Duncan
Robinson, Facebook Hit by German Competition Probe, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2016),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1f4afa34-e05e-11e5-96b79f778349aba2.html#axzz45ztsHvWq.
56
See Jeff Zalesin, Attys Must Flag Problems in M&A, Enforcers Say, LAW360 (Apr. 8,
2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/782405/print?section=competition (“Vestager said
that Germany’s current antitrust investigation into Facebook Inc.’s data protection practices
could make ‘a very valuable contribution’ to the understanding of how privacy and
competition interact.”); see also Jeff Zalesin, EU Embraces Support Role in Facebook
Antitrust Probe, LAW360 (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/768063/euembraces-support-role-in-facebook-antitrust-probe.
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German privacy law by the country’s privacy regulators.57 Finally, the
Facebook matter could be a turf battle—an effort by the Bundeskartellamt
to preempt efforts by German privacy regulators to achieve greater control
over the digital economy and its leading high technology participants.
Whatever the explanation turns out to be, the Facebook
investigation is a striking example of the use of competition law to enforce
obligations that originate in non-antitrust domains—in this instance, data
protection. The Bundeskartellamt’s announcement of the Facebook inquiry
disavowed the use of competition law to treat “every law infringement . . .
[by] a dominant company” as a competition law violation.58 Even so, one
can imagine many instances in which a dominant firm’s misconduct (e.g., a
violation of laws governing environmental protection) injures consumer
interests, and distorts consumer choice, by enabling the dominant firm to
use noncompliance with other laws to gain a competitive advantage
(specifically, the avoidance of costs that would be incurred to comply) over
rivals that obey the rules. In effect, this would make the competition agency
the backstop enforcer of a potentially large collection of other laws, at least
with respect to dominant enterprises.59
One additional example of leveraging across agencies comes from
the U.S., and involves the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(“CFPB”). In 2013, Ally Financial was seeking approval from the Federal
Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to convert from a
bank holding company to a financial holding company.60 It was also being
investigated by the CFPB, an independent bureau located within the
57

Privacy is a fundamental human right under EU law. See ORLA LYNSKEY, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF EU DATA PROTECTION LAW 8–9 (2015) (setting out the foundations and
content of EU data protection law). For this reason, one might argue that all competition
authorities within the EU, at the Commission level and within the member states, have an
obligation to account for privacy in applying competition law. We are grateful to Orla
Lynskey for this point.
58
See Bundeskartellamt, supra note 53.
59
The full implications of such an approach were suggested in an extraordinary proposal,
advanced by FTC Chairman Michael Pertschuk in the late 1970s, that the Commission
might use its authority (to prohibit unfair methods of competition) to challenge
noncompliance with legal obligations governing environmental protection, immigration, and
worker safety. The FTC never implemented this theory of enforcement, but Pertschuk’s
proposal starkly framed the question of when noncompliance with other regulatory
commands should serve as a basis for antitrust liability. This episode is analyzed in William
MacLeod et al., Three Rules and a Constitution: Consumer Protection Finds Its Limits in
Competition Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 943, 952–54 (2005).
60
Yuka Hayashi, Consumer Watchdog Pushed Discrimination Case on Vulnerable Firm:
Report, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/consumer-watchdogpushed-discrimination-case-on-vulnerable-firm-report-1448404301. See also Rachel
Witkowski, CFPB Overestimates Potential Discrimination, Documents Show, AM. BANKER
(Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regulation/cfpb-overestimatespotential-discrimination-documents-show-1076742-1.html.
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Federal Reserve.61 Although the CFPB has no regulatory authority over
auto dealers,62 it decided to investigate whether the loan portfolios of
indirect auto lenders such as Ally indicated that auto dealers were offering
less favorable terms to minority borrowers.63
According to the former CEO of Ally, the CFPB “threatened to
derail [Ally’s] efforts to obtain key regulatory approvals if it didn’t agree to
settle,” by paying $100 million, and begin offering below-market rates to
minorities.64 He complained that Ally had been “strong-armed” by a
regulator that “absolutely knew they had tremendous leverage over us,” and
was trying to change industry policy with a trumped-up case.65
Internal CFPB memos confirm that agency personnel knew that
Ally needed to obtain regulatory approval, and the impending deadline to
obtain that approval gave Ally a very strong incentive to settle its dispute
with the CFPB.66 Absent the need to obtain approval from the Federal
Reserve, Ally could have forced the CFPB to prove its case in court—and
there were major weaknesses in the CFPB’s case.67 It is impossible to know
61

We address the unusual institutional status of the CFPB in Hyman & Kovacic, Why Who
Does What Matters, supra note 8, at 1487–90.
62
See 12 U.S.C. § 5519 (2012).
63
Hayashi, supra note 58.
64
Paul Sperry, Bank CEO Reveals How Obama Administration Shook Him Down, N.Y.
POST (Feb. 21, 2016), http://nypost.com/2016/02/21/bank-ceo-reveals-how-obamaadministration-shook-him-down (“The former CEO of Ally Financial Inc. says the Obama
administration abused its power by holding the bank’s business hostage in order to coerce a
record settlement of ‘trumped-up’ racism charges and push profit-killing new regulations on
the entire auto-lending industry . . . . Michael A. Carpenter, who helmed Detroit-based Ally
from 2009 to 2015, complained in an exclusive interview that Obama’s powerful consumer
watchdog agency threatened to derail the bank’s efforts to obtain key regulatory approvals if
it didn’t agree to settle the allegations out of court.”).
65
Id.
66
Hayashi, supra note 60; Witkowski, supra note 60.
67
Sperry, supra note 64 (noting the former CEO asserted “we would have fought the
CFPB’s trumped-up accusations in every court in the land” if Ally hadn’t needed to obtain
regulatory approval.) The weaknesses included relying on decidedly imperfect proxies to
determine whether a particular consumer was a minority, and the CFPB’s failure to take
account of credit scores in evaluating loan terms. Witkowski, supra note 58. Lending new
meaning to the phrase “good enough for government work,” the CFPB argued it was better
to over-estimate disparities than to under-estimate them. Id. So much for Blackstone’s
observation, “better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.” See
Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 174 (1997) (quoting 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352). Similarly, the CFPB argued that credit ratings did not
“reflect a legitimate business need.” In re Ally Fin. Inc., 2013 CFPB Admin. Proc. LEXIS
125 at P 26
(Dec. 20, 2013) (Consent Order). It also sought damages for emotional distress. Sean
Higgins, Consumer Bureau Overestimating Numbers Hurt by Discrimination, WASHINGTON
EXAMINER (Sept. 18, 2015) http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/consumer-bureauoverestimating-numbers-hurt-by-discrimination/article/2572419. It seems unlikely the CFPB
would fare well if it took these aggressive positions in actual litigation before an Article III
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how the counterfactual would have played out, but it seems extraordinarily
unlikely the CFPB would have been able to extract $100 million and a
change in Ally’s business practices—let alone do so under the same time
frame—except under conditions that gave the CFPB an extraordinary
degree of regulatory leverage.
D.

Leveraging with a “Public Interest” Mandate

Many statutes delegate expansive regulatory authority by requiring
an agency to attend to the “public interest” in making decisions.68 For
example, in evaluating proposed transactions involving licenses, the
Federal Communications Commission is required to evaluate whether the
transaction will serve “the public interest, convenience, and necessity.”69 In
reviewing mergers, state public utility commissions operate under replicas
of the federal public interest rules, and can use their gatekeeping powers to
obtain various concessions involving community services.70
These “public interest” standards make it easy for agencies to
engage in regulatory leveraging.71 The FCC recently used the merger
review process to strong-arm Charter Communications to “live up to
stringent requirements that don’t apply to its bigger rivals,” including net
neutrality standards that the FCC has been unable to impose through direct
regulation.72 Over the past decade, the FCC has used this strategy to impose
judge.
68
For example, a number of jurisdictions have incorporated a public interest test in the
merger control provisions of their competition laws. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Public Interest Considerations in Merger Control,
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/public-interest-considerations-in-merger-control.htm
(last visited June 30, 2016).
69
47 U.S.C. §§ 214(e)(2) & 310(d) (2012). See also Jon Sallet, FCC Transaction Review:
Competition and the Public Interest, FCC Blog (Aug. 12, 2014, 12:39 PM),
https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2014/08/12/fcc-transaction-review-competition-andpublic-interest.
70
See Erik Filipink, Serving the “Public Interest”—Traditional vs Expansive Utility
Regulation 3 (Nat’l Reg. Research Inst. Working Paper, Report No. 10-02, 2009),
http://www.energycollection.us/Energy-Regulators/Serving-Public-Interest.pdf.
71
See, e.g., Brendan Sasso, How Mega-Mergers Give the FCC Stealth Power for Net
Neutrality, ATLANTIC (May 29, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/05/how-mega-mergers-give-the-fccstealth-power-for-net-neutrality/456969.
72
Shalini Ramachandran and John D. McKinnon, Regulators Recommend Approval of
Charter-Time Warner Cable Deal, WALL ST. J., (Apr. 25, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/regulators-recommend-approval-of-charter-time-warner-cabledeal-1461611989 (“Under a deal with the U.S. Justice Department and Federal
Communications Commission, Charter agreed to abandon for seven years several common
industry practices that the government feared could threaten the growth of rival online video
providers such as Netflix Inc. and Hulu. The company agreed not to impose data caps or
charge broadband Internet customers based on data usage, practices that have riled
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net neutrality constraints on AT&T, Verizon, BellSouth, Comcast, and
NBC.73 The FCC has also used regulatory leveraging in other domains: two
decades ago, the chairman of the FCC used the merger review process to
strong-arm Westinghouse into increasing the number of hours devoted to
children’s educational programming on CBS.74
It is not just the federal government that takes advantage of
regulatory leveraging. In March 2016, the District of Columbia Public
Service Commission conditioned its approval of the Exelon-Pepco merger
on a host of ancillary provisions.75 The public service commission had
rejected the transaction twice previously,76 but reversed field once the
parties provided a sufficiently large inducement to do so—in the form of a
commitment to relocate certain offices to D.C.; the hiring of unionized
workers; and at least $1.9 million in annual average charitable contributions
to organizations located in D.C. or benefiting D.C. residents.77
III.

BENEFITS AND COSTS OF REGULATORY LEVERAGING

To make the benefits and costs of regulatory leveraging more
concrete, imagine that you represent a multinational entity that has
proposed a substantial merger. You arrive at a meeting with personnel from
the DOJ Antitrust Division to discuss the merger. You sit down, and find a
bunch of people sitting in the room. You say, “I recognize some of the
people here. We’ve had discussions with them. Here is the front office from
the antitrust division. Here are the case handlers. But can you introduce me
customers. Charter will also be required to build out its broadband access to two million
homes, which would compel it to compete against other cable companies in some markets,
according to a person familiar with the matter.”).
73
Marvin Ammori, Here’s How Charter Will Commit to an Open Internet, WIRED (June 25,
2015) http://www.wired.com/2015/06/heres-charter-will-commit-open-internet.
74
Edmund L. Andrews, FCC Approval Seen Today For Westinghouse-CBS Deal, N.Y.
TIMES, (Nov. 22, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/22/business/the-media-businessfcc-approval-seen-today-for-westinghouse-cbs-deal.html. Interestingly, there was an internal
dispute within the agency on this issue, with the chairman insisting on linking approval of
the deal to the pledge to increase children’s programming, and three commissioners insisting
that the FCC should make it clear that “it was in no way demanding that CBS or
Westinghouse meet any quantitative requirements for children’s programming as a condition
of approval.” Id.
75
See Ben Nuckols, District Of Columbia Regulators Voted For A Second Time Friday To
Reject A Proposed $6.8 Billion Merger Between Power Companies Exelon And Pepco, But
They Said The Deal Would Go Forward If New Conditions Are Met, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Feb. 26, 2016, available at http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2016-02-26/dcregulators-reject-exelon-pepco-deal-but-could-reconsider.
76
Thomas Heath & Aaron C. Davis, D.C. Panel Backs Pepco-Exelon Merger, WASH. POST,
Mar. 24, 2016, at B1.
77
In re Joint Application of Exelon Corp. et al., Pub. Serv. Comm’n. of the Dist. of
Columbia, Order No. 18148 ¶¶ CC, DD, HH (Mar. 23, 2016), available at
http://wtop.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/PSC-order-Pepco-Exelon.pdf.
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to the rest of the people in the room?” The responses come back fast and
furious. “I’m from the DOJ Tax Division.” “I’m from the DOJ Civil Rights
Division.” “I handle government contracts matters for DOJ’s Civil
Division.” “I’m from the EEOC.” “I’m from the CFPB.” “I’m from the
EPA.”
Understandably enough, you respond, “What are these people
doing here? I’m here to discuss our merger—and just the merger. Those
disputes are handled by other lawyers. I don’t know anything about them.”
The head of the merger review team responds, “Well, we’re going to talk
about the merger—but we’ve got a whole lot of other issues that we’d also
like to resolve with your client. All those other loose ends are getting in the
way of our ability to analyze the proposed merger. The Attorney General
has instructed me to tell you that if you’re willing to concede each and
every one of these other matters, we can wrap everything up right now, and
get your merger out the door by the end of the week. Or your client can
litigate with all of us over these issues—and it will take as long as it takes.
But the merger won’t be considered until everything else is resolved. It’s
your choice.”
How would you react? What arguments would defenders of
regulatory leveraging make in response? We now turn to those issues.
A.

Benefits/Advantages

The most obvious benefit of regulatory leveraging is that it
promotes more comprehensive settlements. Going back to our first case
study (Bosch-SPX), the FTC already had an open file on SPX, and Bosch
then came to the FTC with the proposed merger.78 Isn’t it more efficient to
enter into one global settlement instead of maintaining two separate
proceedings? If there are benefits in settlement (and there are), more
comprehensive settlements must be better still.
Second, depending on the statutory language employed, leveraging
may be an authorized delegation of congressional authority to deal with
difficult problems in a flexible way. Stated differently, Congress used
“public interest” language to give the agency a hammer that could be
deployed when a regulated entity comes to the agency for merger
approval.79 But the agency can only use the hammer in carefully defined
circumstances. The regulated entity can always walk away from the merger,
and continue fighting about the ancillary matter(s). This structure keeps the
agency from expanding its regulatory leverage beyond any given
78

See supra Part II.A.
See generally Filipink, supra note 68 (identifying various ways in which the “public
interest” standard has been used by regulators to reach issues that are not typically
understood to be within the regulator’s jurisdiction).
79
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transaction, while giving it the flexibility to solve problems without going
through the drudgery of rulemaking, or starting a separate case.
Even when the agency operates without the benefit of a public
interest mandate, leveraging might be viewed as an admirable example of
administrative adaptability and creativity. A regulator could defend its
unwillingness to address a serious problem by pointing to the limits of its
powers, and by interpreting those powers in a cramped way that justifies
passivity. By contrast to this cautious view of public administration, the
regulator that leverages its powers to solve difficult problems is being
inventive and entrepreneurial. And if the agency goes too far, the courts and
the legislature stand ready to protect the rule of law.
B.

Costs/Disadvantages

Regulatory leveraging also involves real risks and disadvantages.
For starters, regulatory leveraging leads to less disciplined decisionmaking
by governmental agencies. Substantive antitrust law governs merger
reviews,80 but regulatory leveraging encourages agencies to ignore or
downgrade these controls. The result is the discounting of both process and
substance, in favor of the unimpeded pursuit of more nebulous (and often
contestable) goals. Among other consequences, this comes at a
considerable cost in predictability for affected commercial parties.
Second, regulatory leveraging leads to decisionmaking that is less
transparent and less accountable. Merger review rarely ends up in court,81
so agency leadership need only persuade itself that its “wish list” is worth
pursuing. Firms badly want to obtain immediate approval of their
mergers,82 so agency leadership has them over a barrel. Because the “wish
list” of desired concessions is achieved through settlement, in many
jurisdictions it is, by definition, not subject to appeal.
Third, if multiple agencies handle merger review, the agency that
uses regulatory leveraging may place itself at a disadvantage. Currently, the
FTC and DOJ both conduct merger reviews.83 The two agencies allocate
matters between each other chiefly on the basis of recent experience with
specific industries. Once word gets around that the FTC (and only the FTC)
is engaging in regulatory leveraging, industries that fall within the FTC’s
purview likely will complain to Congress. If that happens, Congress is
likely to reexamine the logic of having two agencies in the merger review
space. Certainly, FTC personnel were well aware of this risk when they
80

See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
See BRODER, supra note 20, at 189–90 (“As a practical matter, the threat of such a suit, or
the filing of the complaint, is often enough to dissuade parties from proceeding at all.”).
82
See id.
83
Id. at 189.
81
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were considering whether to use leveraging in evaluating GoogleDoubleClick and Google-AdMob.84
Fourth, regulatory leveraging can be used for “good” or “evil.”
Privacy and data security standards don’t have an obvious ideological or
partisan valence—but would people be quite so complacent about
regulatory leveraging if they knew that the competition agency was going
to be run by their worst enemy? Stated more concretely, what if the
competition agency demanded one or more of the following as a condition
of approving a merger involving the listed companies:
*Apple had to agree to unlock any iPhone provided to it by
the Department of Homeland Security, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the Drug Enforcement Administration, or the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.
*Verizon had to agree to provide immediate and
unrestricted access to the text messages associated with any
subscriber’s number, without requiring a warrant or
notifying the subscriber, upon request by any federal, state,
or local governmental entity.
*Google had to create a backdoor to Gmail, and turn it over
to the National Security Agency.
*Salesforce had to fire its CEO, who was the ringleader of
corporate attempts to pressure Republican state lawmakers
on social issues.85 For every dollar Salesforce had to pay its
CEO to go away, it had to pay ten times that amount to
support the Tea Party.
*PayPal had to reverse its decision to cancel a $3.6 million
operations center in Charlotte, North Carolina, in response
to the state’s enactment of the “Public Facilities Privacy
and Security Act.”86 PayPal also had to spend at least twice
that amount endowing a center at the University of North
Carolina for the study of the War of Northern Aggression.
Finally, each member of PayPal’s board and senior
management (including vegetarians, vegans, and those with
84

See supra Part II.B.
Monica Langley, Salesforce’s Marc Benioff Has Kicked Off New Era of Corporate Social
Activism, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/salesforces-marc-benioffhas-kicked-off-new-era-of-corporate-social-activism-1462201172.
86
Susanna Kim, Boycott Over North Carolina’s LGBT ‘Bathroom Law’ May Be Gaining
Traction as Economic Fallout Grows, ABCNEWS (Apr. 13, 2016),
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/boycott-north-carolinas-lgbt-bathroom-law-gainingtraction/story?id=38367656. The law bans people from using bathrooms that don’t match
the sex indicated on their birth certificates.
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religious objections to eating pork) had to spend a week
eating only Carolina BBQ and drinking sweet tea, after
which they had to personally hand-write a five-page essay
on the virtues of that diet.87
*All companies seeking merger approval had to make large
contributions to foundations created and administered by
the antitrust regulators. The funds may be used for any
purpose the regulators deem appropriate.
How do you like regulatory leveraging now?
Fifth, once it becomes clear that regulatory leveraging is what wellestablished first-world regulators do, it will be much more difficult to
persuade competition authorities in other nations not to take advantage of
the same opportunities. This will prove to be a particularly challenging
problem in countries where competition authorities are struggling to deal
with political interference in their decision-making process, and outright
corruption.
Finally, because regulatory leveraging is merger-specific, it creates
firm-specific discontinuities in the applicable law. Only firms that have had
a merger reviewed by the agency will be subject to regulatory leverage—
and the details of the resulting settlements may well vary, depending on the
priorities of agency leadership at the time the merger was reviewed, and the
extent to which firm management was willing to give away the store to get
the merger approved. Of course, regulatory leveraging during the merger
review process can deliver a clear signal about the agency’s preferences—
and firms might fall into line voluntarily, even if they do not anticipate
pursuing a merger anytime soon.88 But some firms may resist, and others
may simply ignore the strong hints being dropped by the agency. In
combination, these dynamics are likely to create significant firm-specific
discontinuities in the rule of law.89 Those discontinuities will have bad
87

Obviously, the antitrust agencies could not constitutionally require PayPal’s Board of
Directors to each complete a 5-page essay extolling the virtues of sweet tea and Carolina
BBQ. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there
is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”).
88
See Jerry Brito, “Agency Threats” and the Rule of Law: An Offer You Can’t Refuse, 37
HARV. J. L. PUB. POL’Y 553, 553 (2012); Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L. J. 1841
1841–42 (2011).
89
There is some evidence that the CFPB’s campaign against discriminatory auto lending has
had exactly this result. Rachel Witkowski, The Inside Story of the CFPB’s Battle Over Auto
Lending, AM. BANKER (Sep. 24, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/lawregulation/the-inside-story-of-the-cfpbs-battle-over-auto-lending-10769401.html?zkPrintable=1&nopagination=1.
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results, including impeding the development of a robust market for mergers
and acquisitions.
IV.

SQUARING THE REGULATORY LEVERAGING CIRCLE

How should the conundrum of regulatory leveraging be addressed?
Following Professor James Q. Wilson, we propose “a few modest
suggestions that may make a small difference.”90
A.

Express Delegations of Authority

If Congress wants agencies to engage in regulatory leveraging, it
should explicitly authorize the process, and identify some boundaries.
Should agencies only engage in leveraging for substantive areas of law
within their zone of regulatory authority, or should they be allowed to range
more widely? If agencies range beyond their own zone of regulatory
authority, should it be only at the request (or at least with the concurrence)
of the agency that is actually responsible for that substantive area? What
criteria should an agency employ in deciding whether to engage in
regulatory leveraging? How long can an agency hold up a regulated entity,
seeking to get concessions? What counts as a reasonable basis for holding
up the regulated entity? Can an agency demand something that it cannot
directly impose, either because of limitations in its own regulatory
authority, or because doing so would be unconstitutional? And so on.
Simply stated, an express congressional delegation of authority
would go a long way in legitimating the use of regulatory leveraging. The
absence of an express delegation of authority should be understood as
equally dispositive in the opposite direction. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius.
B.

More Transparency

Agencies should be much more explicit about what they are doing
in the regulatory leveraging space. This will simultaneously discipline their
use of regulatory leveraging, and force them to articulate and justify their
use of this tool. If an agency believes that regulatory leveraging is a
sensible way of solving a problem it confronts, the agency should
forthrightly explain and justify its actions. If an agency isn’t willing to brag
about what it is doing, it probably shouldn’t be doing it. Sunlight may not
be a perfect disinfectant, but if regulators can’t stand the heat, they should
get out of the kitchen.
90

JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO
IT 369 (1989).
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C.

Fewer Gates

More gates means more gatekeepers—and more opportunities for
regulatory leveraging. The obvious solution is to be exceedingly careful
about creating new gates, and revisit the necessity of existing gates. So,
before creating any new gates, legislators should explicitly decide whether
they are absolutely necessary—and if so, whether the responsible agency
may engage in regulatory leveraging, and the circumstances under which
leveraging can occur. Legislators should also “sunset” all gates, forcing
routine reconsideration of the necessity of each gate.
D.

Better Norms

Regulatory leveraging is, at best, a third-best solution for dealing
with policy problems. In some instances, internal political dynamics will
discourage the use of regulatory leveraging.91 But a robust norm against the
use of regulatory leveraging will play a useful backup role in disciplining
the inappropriate exercise of gatekeeping authority.

91

See supra notes 36–50, 67 and accompanying text (discussing internal political constraints
on use of regulatory leveraging by the FTC and FCC).
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Ex Post Review

As always, more data would be helpful. We don’t know how often
regulatory leveraging takes place, the circumstances under which it occurs,
and how effective (or ineffective) it actually is. There have been complaints
about the exercise of regulatory leverage by multiple entities within the
federal government, including the CFPB,92 FCC,93 FDA,94 and the
Department of Education.95 At the state and local level, many “takings”
cases involve similar instances of regulatory exactions, including the
compelled surrender of land to create bicycle or pedestrian paths,96 and
cash settlements to be controlled and disbursed by the regulators.97 And
there are the long-standing arguments over “unconstitutional conditions”
and the spending power.98
92

See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
See Sasso, supra note 69.
94
More specifically, the FDA’s prohibition of off-label marketing is a clear example of the
FDA leveraging its authority over drug labeling. See Peter J. Henning, FDA’s ‘Off-Label’
Drug Policy Leads to Free Speech Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/business/dealbook/fdas-off-label-drug-policy-leads-tofree-speech-fight.html?_r=0. Similarly, although the FDA is prohibited from regulating the
practice of medicine, it has used its authority over drug approvals to limit the circumstances
under which certain drugs can be prescribed. See 15 U.S.C. § 396 (2012) (“Nothing in this
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PROBLEM OR SOLUTION?
That said, we don’t know nearly enough about the prevalence and
results of regulatory leverage. Only a consistent practice of ex post review
can cast light on these issues.
V.

LEVERAGING REGULATORS

To this point, we have focused on regulators leveraging private
entities. But, under some circumstances, private parties may be able to
leverage regulators. We intend to address that issue at greater length in
another article -- so we limit our analysis of leveraging regulators to one
recent high profile example. As part of its review of the proposed merger
between Aetna and Humana, the DOJ asked Aetna what the consequences
would be if the merger was not approved. Aetna’s CEO responded in a
July 5, 2016 letter as follows:

Housing Trust, of which two named plaintiffs, City officials, were to serve as trustees.”).
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REGULATORY LEVERAGING

Our analysis to date makes clear that if the deal
were challenged and/or blocked we would need to take
immediate actions to mitigate public exchange and ACA
small group losses. Specifically, if the DOJ sues to enjoin
the transaction, we will immediately take action to reduce
our 2017 exchange footprint.
We currently plan, as part of our strategy following
the acquisition, to expand from 15 states in 2016 to 20
states in 2017. However, if we are in the midst of litigation
over the Humana transaction, given the risks described
above, we will not be able to expand to the five additional
states.
In addition, we would also withdraw from at least
five additional states where generating a market return
would take too long for us to justify, given the costs
associated with a potential breakup of the transaction. In
other words, instead of expanding to 20 states next year,
we would reduce our presence to no more than 10 states.99
Stated differently: “Nice exchanges you’ve got here. It would be a shame if
anything was to happen to them.”100
Why would this attempt at leveraging regulators have any traction?
DOJ enforces the antitrust law. It doesn’t care whether Aetna participates
in the public exchanges created by the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (“PPACA”). But, the Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) and the White House care a great deal about the viability of the
public exchanges. PPACA (also known as “Obamacare” and as the
“Affordable Care Act”) was the signature domestic political achievement of
the Obama administration -- and the public exchanges were (and are) an
essential part of that initiative. The public exchanges were already facing
significant difficulties because other insurers had either withdrawn or had
issued threats/promises to do so.101 Those difficulties would be
dramatically increased if Aetna pulled the plug on continued
participation.102
99
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PROBLEM OR SOLUTION?
In the end, Aetna’s attempt to leverage the regulators did not
succeed. DOJ challenged the Aetna-Humana merger.103 Aetna responded
by dropping its exchange operations in 11 states. That move doubtless
caused considerable consternation at HHS and the White House -- but that
was not enough leverage to get HHS and the White House to force DOJ to
back off.104
Of course, the success or failure of any given attempt at leveraging
regulators is not the issue. What matters is that this is a game that both
sides can play. Those who don’t like the leveraging of regulators – and use
words like “blackmail,” “extortion,” and “strong-arming” to describe such
conduct should at least consider the “sauce for the gander” implications of
their disdain.
CONCLUSION
Regulators like leverage—and some of the time, it is the only
available solution to a particular problem. But regulatory leverage raises
very real risks and costs, which counsel for considerably greater caution
than regulatory agencies have shown to date. Unless properly disciplined,
regulatory leveraging becomes lawlessness.
Some of the time, regulatory leveraging is a problem. And, some of
the time, regulatory leveraging is the only available solution. This is not the
kind of scenario that lends itself to a simple fix, over and above the
suggestions we offer in Part IV.
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